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“-How long do you want these messages to remain secret?
+I want them to remain secret for as long as men are capable of evil.”
Neal Stephenson, Cryptonomicon
Abstract
Proxy signature scheme is an extension of digital signature scheme first introduced by
Mambo et al. in 1996, which allows a signer to delegate the signing capability to a
designated person, called a proxy signer. There are three types of delegation, namely,
full delegation, partial delegation, and delegation by warrant. In early proxy signature
schemes, the identity of the proxy signer can be revealed by any trusted authority if
needed. However, a secured proxy signature scheme must satisfy various properties, such
as, verifiability, strong unforgeability, nonrepudiation, privacy, and strong identifiability.
In this thesis, we propose a strong proxy signature scheme based on two computa-
tionally hard assumptions, namely, Discrete Logarithmic Problem (DLP) and Compu-
tational Diffie-Helmann (CDH) problem, which satisfies all the security properties of
a standard proxy signature scheme. The property ‘strong’ refers to the fact that only
a designated person can only verify the authenticity of the proxy signature. No one,
not even the original signer can verify the signature. The proposed scheme is based on
partial delegation, in which a new proxy signing key is generated by the secret key of
original signer. Also we compared the performance of the proposed scheme in terms
of signature length, computational overhead and execution time with a popular scheme
and found that our scheme has less computational overhead and of less signature length.
Moreover, our scheme is proved to be secure against some active attacks.
The proposed scheme has wide applications in areas such as e-voting, e-commerce, secure
transaction and e-cash.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A proxy signature permits a delegator to give partial signing rights to other parties
called proxy signers. In other words, Proxy signature is a digital signature where
an original signer delegates her signing power to a proxy signer, and then the
proxy signer signs the message on behalf of the original signer. For example, a
company’s manager wants to go for a long trip. She would need an agent called
a proxy agent, to whom she would assign her signing capability, and after the
delgation,i.e. power assignment, the proxy agent would sign the documents on
behalf of the manager. It has been 18 years since the notion of proxy signature
was first introduced. However, the cryptographic treatment on proxy signature
was introduced by Mambo et al. in 1996 [1][2].
1.1 Properties of proxy signature
Proxy signature is popular and is used widely because of its security properties.
The security properties of proxy signature are [2]:
• Verifiability: From a proxy signature a verifier can be convinced of the
original signers agreement on the signed message.
• Strong unforgeability: A valid proxy signature can only be generated by
the designated proxy signer.
• Strong non-repudiation: A proxy signer cannot deny a valid proxy signa-
ture he/she generates.
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• Non-designated: The warrant issued by the original signer does not specify
who the proxy signer is. It is also transferable among proxy signers.
• Strong identifiability: From a proxy signature, any verifier can determine
the identity of the proxy signer.
• Proxy privacy: No one can determine the identity of the proxy signer only
from the proxy signature.
• Privacy revocation: Once needed, a trusted authority can reveal the proxy
signers identity of the proxy signature.
1.2 Categories of proxy signature
Proxy signature has been classified into three broad categories. They are [2][3]:
• full delegation
• partial delegation
• delegation with warrant
1.2.1 Full Delegation
In proxy signature with full delegation, an original signer gives her private key to a
proxy signer and the proxy signer using original signers private key signs document.
The drawback of proxy signature with full delegation is that the original signer
and proxy signer are very difficult to distinguish from each other.
1.2.2 Partial Delegation
In partial delegation proxy signature, the original signer derives a proxy key from
her private key and hands it over to the proxy signer as a delegation capability. In
proxy signature with partial delegation, the proxy signer can misuse the delegation
capability, because partial delegation cannot restrict the proxy signers signing
capability.
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1.2.3 Delegation with warrant
The drawbacks of full delegation and partial delegation are eliminated by partial
delegation with warrant. A warrant explicitly states the identity of signers, period
of delegation and the qualification of messages on which the proxy signer can sign,
etc. In other words, the warrant is used to certify that the proxy signer is really
authorized by the original signer.
1.3 Related Work
The concept of proxy signatures was first proposed by Mambo et al. in 1996
[1]. He said that a proxy signature scheme allows a signer to delegate the signing
capability to a designated person and the designated person was called a proxy
signer. Lee et al. constructed a strong non-designated proxy signature scheme in
2001 [2]. The concept used in non-designated proxy signature scheme was that the
original signer does not specify his/her proxy signer in proxy key issuing phase.
Anyone can construct original signers proxy signing key if he/she owns the warrant
and some secret parameters issued by the original signer. Then, it can be used
by he/she to sign messages on behalf of the original signer. In the non-designated
proxy signature scheme, the warrant and secret parameters are transferable among
the proxy signers.
In 2002, Shum and Wei presented an enhancement to the Lee et al.s scheme. In
their scheme they have tried to hide the identity of the proxy signer. The identity
of the proxy signer cannot be determined by anyone from the proxy signature only.
However, a trusted authority can reveal the proxy signers identity if required [2].
In 2005, Narn-Yih Lee and Ming-Feng Lee, showed that the ShumWei scheme
cannot keep the property of the strong unforgeability[2], i.e both original signer
and proxy signature can generate valid proxy signatures. In 2006, Huang et al.
proposed the first proxy signature scheme in the standard model and following
them other schemes, such as, the Yu et al.’s designated verifier proxy signature
scheme were proposed [4].
In 2007, Kemal Bicakci presented a simple alternative approach that eliminates
public-key cryptography in key generation, offers certainty and simplicity in the
dispute resolution and avoids swallow attacks. They also introduce the concept
of 1-out-of-n threshold traceable one-time signatures as an efficiency improvement
[8]. In 2009, Liu Zhen-hua1, Hu Yu-pu, Zhang Xiang-song and Ma Hua gave a
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security model of proxy signature schemes with fast revocation is formalized [7].
In 2011, Ying Sun, Chunxiang Xu, Yong Yu, Yi Mu proposed a new construction
of proxy signature which is strongly unforgeable in the standard model with the
computational DiffieHellman assumption in bilinear groups [6]. In 2012, Zhang
Jian-hong, Xu Yu-wei, Cui Yuan-bo and Chen Zhi-peng have suggested a novel
short proxy signature scheme [5].
1.4 Motivation
Unforgeability means that only the designated proxy signer can generate a valid
proxy signature.In our literary survey we found that the property of non-forgeability
was not satisfied in terms of security. Also, the length of proxy signature is large
and has high communicational overhead.This motivated us to design a secure proxy
scheme which would overcome this drawback which was found in many existing
papers. It was also observed in our literary survey that a malicious original signer
is able to generate a valid proxy signature by himself/herself without delegating
the signing capability to any proxy signer.
1.5 Objective
The objective of our scheme is to design a Strong proxy signature scheme with
partial delegation holding properties such as verifiability, non-repudiation, non-
designated, proxy privacy and aims to achieve low computation and communi-
cation overhead and short signature length. We will be emphasizing more on
overcoming the security flaw which was seen in many schemes [2]. The objective
behind the project is also to produce a strong signature of short length with less
computational overhead. Here, the property ’strong’ refers to the fact that only a
designated person can verify the authenticity of the proxy signature. No one, not
even the original signer can verify the signature.
1.6 Thesis Outline
This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 discusses the preliminaries, the
proposed scheme is discussed in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 shows the implementation
of the proposed scheme in which we will discuss the security analysis, comparative
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performance evaluation and results of implementation. Finally, we conclude with
Chapter 5 and give few future directions of our work.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
We will be discussing few of the preliminaries which we have used thoughout our
project work.
2.1 Discrete Logarithmic Problem (DLP)
The multiplicative subgroup of any finite field GF(q) is cyclic where q is a prime
power, and the elements g ∈ GF (q) that generate this subgroup are referred to
as primitive elements[9]. When a primitive element g ∈ GF (q) and any u
∈ GF (q)∗ = GF (q) − {0} is given, the discrete logarithm of u with respect to g
is that integer k, 0 ≤ k ≤ (q − 1), for which
u = gk (2.1.1)
It will be written as k = logg u. The discrete logarithm of u is sometimes called
as the index of u. Finding the value of k is very difficult [9].
Besides the intrinsic interest that the problem of computing discrete logarithms
has, discrete logarithm is of considerable importance in cryptography. An efficient
algorithm for discrete logarithms would make a large number of authentication
and key-exchange systems insecure.
There are many proposed algorithms for computing discrete logarithms which are
known today. Among them index-calculus algorithm is the most powerful general
purpose algorithm.
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2.2 SHA-1 Hash Approach
SHA1 is an abbreviated form of Secure Hashing Algorithm. SHA-1 is a hashing
algorithm designed and constructed by the United States National Security Agency
and published by NIST. It is the improved version of the original SHA-0 and was
first published in 1995. Although SHA-1 will soon be replaced by the newer and
potentially more secure SHA-2 family of hashing functions, currently the most
widely used SHA hash function is SHA-1. It is currently being used in a large
number of applications, including TLS, SSL, SSH and PGP.
The output of SHA-1 is a 160 bit digest of any sized file or input. In structure it
is similar to the previous MD4 and MD5 hash functions; in fact it shares some of
the initial hash values. It uses a block size of 512 bit and has a maximum message
size of 264 - 1 bits. By implementing SHA-1, we can compare implementations
of cryptographic functions with specifications. If we ever need to verify that an
existing implementation of a cryptographic function is secure this could be useful.
The performance of the code can be optimized by running time profiles [10].
2.3 Integer Factorization Problem
There exist a variety of factorizing algorithms such as trial division, Fermat fac-
torization, Pollard rho factorization, Brent’s factorization method, Pollard p - 1
factorization, etc. Fundamental Theorem of Arithmetic : The fundamental
theorem of arithmetic states that every positive integer can be written uniquely as
a product of primes, when the primes in the product are written in non-decreasing
order [14],i.e the fundamental theorem of arithmetic means that any composite
integer can be factored.
If two large prime numbers are given, there are fast algorithms for multiplying
them together. However, it is difficult to find the prime factors if one is given the
product of two large primes. The apparent difficulty of factoring large integers
forms the basis of some modern cryptographic algorithms. The RSA encryption
algorithm [11], and the Blum Blum Shub cryptographic pseudorandom number
generator [12] both rely on the difficulty of factoring large integers. If it were
possible to factor products of large prime numbers quickly, these algorithms would
be insecure.
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The SSL encryption used for TCP/IP connections over the World Wide Web de-
pends on the security of the RSA algorithm [13]. Hence if one could factor large
integers quickly, ”secured” Internet sites would no longer remain secure. It is
unknown whether factoring is in the complexity class P in computational com-
plexity theory. In technical terms, this means that there is no known algorithm
for answering the question whether integer N have a factor less than integer s in a
number of steps that is O(P(n)), where n is the number of digits in N, and P(n) is
a polynomial function. Above all, no one has ever proved that such an algorithm
exists, or does not exist. In layman’s terms, one can simply ask the question what
is the fastest algorithm for factoring large numbers. This is an important open
question in mathematics.
Chapter 3
The proposed Strong proxy
signature scheme based on partial
delegation
The proposed scheme is a work undertaken to overcome the shortcomings of the
scheme given by Narn-Yih Lee, Ming-Feng Lee (2005) [2]. Our proposed scheme
focuses on the following:
• identifiability
• low computational and communicational overhead
• short signature length
• non-repudiation
• verifiability
• non-designated
• proxy privacy
• unforgeability
3.1 Layout of the proposed scheme
The proposed scheme consists of four phases. Namely,
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Figure 3.1: Layout of the proposed scheme
• Alias issuing phase
• Proxy key generation phase
• Signing phase
• Verification phase
Trusted Alias Issuing Authority T is responsible for issuing an alias for every proxy
signer. M denotes an original signer, P denotes a proxy signer, respectively and V
denotes a verifier. Figure 3.1 shows the various participants involed in this scheme.
Some parameters used in this paper are showed as follows:
• p, q : large prime numbers, where q | (p− 1)
• g : an element of order q in Z∗p
• h(.) : a one-way hash function
• m : the signing message
Thesis 11
• mw : the warrant issued by original signer M
• ST : key for proxy signer P, generated by Alias issuing authority T (in figure)
• SM : key for proxy signer P, generated by original signer M (in figure)
• Sproxy : Secret key of the proxy signer P (in figure)
• x : key used by proxy signer P for proxy signature
• l : an integer in Z∗q
• yM : public key of original signer
• yP : public key of proxy signer
• k : an integer in Z∗q
• r : an integer in Z∗p
• s : key generated by original signer for the proxy signer
• u : key generated by proxy signer for proxy signature
• t : hashed value
3.2 Alias issuing phase
T issues an alias hP , a public parameter rT and a secret key ST to P and records
the triplet (hP , kP , IDP ) into the database, where IDP is the identity of P. P will
check the validation of secret key ST .
kP ∈R Zq∗
hP = h(kP , IDP ) (3.2.1)
kT ∈R Zq∗, rT = gkT (mod p) (3.2.2)
ST = xTh(hP , rT ) + kT (mod q) (3.2.3)
record(hP , kP , IDP ) check
gST = yT
h(hP ,rT )rT (mod p) (3.2.4)
Thesis 12
3.3 Proxy key generation phase
This phase consists of three subphases. They are:
• Key generation phase
• Proxy delegation phase
• Proxy verification
3.3.1 Key generation phase
An original signer M chooses its private key xM ∈R Zq∗ and publishes public key
yM which is computed as followed
yM = g
xM (mod p) (3.3.1)
kM ∈R Z∗q (3.3.2)
rM = g
kM (mod p) (3.3.3)
SM = xMh(mw, rm, km) (mod q) (3.3.4)
3.3.2 Proxy delegation phase
After generating all the necessary parameters, the original signer M communicates
mw, rM , SM to proxy signer P in a secured manner.
3.3.3 Proxy key verification
The proxy signer checks that
gSM = yMh(mw, rM , kM) (mod p) (3.3.5)
if the above condition is satisfied, the proxy signer accepts SM , ST and combines
with Sproxy to form x as signing key.
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3.4 Signing Phase
The proxy signer P computes the signing key x as:
x = (SM + ST + Sproxy) (mod q) (3.4.1)
where:
Sproxy = xPh(mw, rm) (mod q), xP is the private key of Proxy signer P.
To sign a message m, the proxy signer (P) performs the following operations:
• chooses l ∈R Z∗q and computes u as:
u = gl (mod p) (3.4.2)
• computes :
t = h(m, mw, u
xP l
−1
.gxh(mw,rm)) (mod p) (3.4.3)
Proxy signature message is given by
(t, mw, rM , y, IDM , hP )
3.5 Proxy Verification
Any verifier obtaining the proxy signature (t, mw, rM , y) can verify for the message
m as per the following condition:
t = h(m, mw, yP .y
h(mw,rM )) (mod p) (3.5.1)
Let j = yh(mw,rm)
t = h(m, mw, yP .j) (mod p) (3.5.2)
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If the above condition is satisfied then, (t, mw, rM , y, IDM , hP ) is assumed to be
valid one, else it is rejected.
3.6 Correctness of the proxy signature
The correctness of the proxy signature can be checked as below:
uxP l
−1
.gxh(mw,rM ) = (gl)xP l
−1
.yh(mw,rM ) (3.6.1)
=(gxP ).yh(mw,rM )
=yP .y
h(mw,rM )
where: y = gx (mod p)
Chapter 4
Implementation
In this chapter we will be doing the security analysis of the proposed scheme. A
brief comparison between the existing scheme and proposed scheme will be done
and an overall implementation results will be displayed.
4.1 Security Analysis
As we have mentioned earlier, the proposed scheme will satisfy the security prop-
erties such as verifiability, non-repudiation, non-designated, strong identifiability
and proxy privacy. We’ll be analysing them here.
4.1.1 Verifiability
According to the property of verifiability, from a proxy signature a verifier can be
convinced of the original signers agreement on the signed message. Satisfaction
of this property in this paper can be justified by the fact that the original signer
M is communicating mw, rM , SM to proxy signer P in a secured manner. P uses
mw for his/her proxy signing purposes and send mw along with other parameters
to verifier for verification. From mw the verifier comes to know that the original
signer has agreed upon the signed message.
4.1.2 Non-Repudiation
By the property of non-repudiation a proxy signer cannot deny a valid proxy
signature he/she has generated. This is ensured by the unique key Sproxy of the
15
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proxy signer P which is used in generating the signing key. The generated signing
key is different for different proxy signers and can be generated by the proxy signer
himself, hence, the proxy signer cannot deny a valid proxy signature that he/she
generates.
4.1.3 Non-Designation
Non-designation property says that the warrant issued by the original signer should
not specify who the proxy signer is and it is also transferable among proxy signers.
Again, this property is maintained in the scheme when the original signer M is
communicating only the parameters mw, rM , SM to proxy signer P in a secured
manner. Among these parameter there is no such thing which can specify the
identity of proxy signer.
4.1.4 Strong Identifiability
According to this property any verifier can determine the identity of the proxy
signer from a proxy signature. Equations (3.4.1) and (3.4.3) shows that Sproxy,
which is the unique key of P, is blend with other parameter to get x which is used
to generate t, which in turn is passed on to the verifier. The verifier can derive
the identity of the proxy signer from t.
4.1.5 Strong Unforgeability
In this proxy signature scheme,proxy signing key x is computed by using
(SM , ST , Sproxy) where: Sproxy = xPh(mw, rM), xP is the private key of Proxy signer
P. Assuming that an original signer has access to secret key ST and his own key
SM but he still needs to access Sproxy to compute proxy signing key x. Computing
Sproxy is very difficult as it is known only to a proxy signer. Proxy key x and
xP are used in calculation of verification parameter t as given in the equation
(3.4.3). So, if the value calculated by verifier does not match with the value of
verification parameter calculated in proxy key generation phase, as in equation
(3.5.1) then proxy signature would be regarded as invalid. In this way property of
strong unforgeability is satisfied.
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4.1.6 Proxy Privacy
Proxy privacy property provides that the proxy signature alone is not enough
for anyone to determine the identity of the proxy signer. This is clearly seen
in the equation (3.4.3). And also, the Proxy signature message is given by (t,
mw, rM , y, IDM , hP ).
4.2 Comparative Performance Evaluation
In this section a comparative evaluation of performance of the existing scheme and
the proposed scheme will be done.
4.2.1 Snapshots
Existing Scheme: After implementing the existing scheme in JAVA (NetBeans
IDE 6.9.1) the output obtained is as seen in the figure 4.1
Figure 4.1: Snapshot of the existing scheme
Proposed Scheme: After implementing the proposed scheme in JAVA (NetBeans
IDE 6.9.1) the output obtained is as seen in the figure 4.2
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Figure 4.2: Snapshot of the proposed scheme
Sl.No. Signature Length Warrant Size AI Phase Deleg. Phase S and V Phase
1 200 bytes 63 bytes 9.0 ms 11.0 ms 5.0 ms
2 200 bytes 63 bytes 9.0 ms 10.0 ms 4.0 ms
3 200 bytes 63 bytes 9.0 ms 11.0 ms 7.0 ms
Table 4.1: Results of Existing Scheme
Sl.No. Signature Length Warrant Size AI Phase Deleg. Phase S and V Phase
1 64 bytes 63 bytes 8.0 ms 12.0 ms 10.0 ms
2 64 bytes 63 bytes 8.0 ms 11.0 ms 9.0 ms
3 64 bytes 63 bytes 8.0 ms 11.0 ms 9.0 ms
Table 4.2: Results of Proposed Scheme
4.2.2 Comparison of execution time
The execution time of alias issuing phase, delegation phase and sign and verify
phase along with signature length and warrant length for the existing scheme is
given in the table 4.1. The table shows the results for three tests.
The execution time of alias issuing phase, delegation phase and sign and verify
phase along with signature length and warrant length for the proposed scheme is
given in the table 4.2. The table shows the results for three tests.
Note: In the given tables AI Phase stands for Alias Issuing Phase, Deleg. Phase
is for Delegation Phase and S and V Phase is for Sign and Verify Phase.
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As visible from both the tables, the length of the proxy signature has been greatly
reduced. Though, not much difference can be seen in the execution time of the
delegation and sign and verify phase, communicational overhead has been taken
care of by reducing the number of parameters needed to be communicated to the
verifier without hampering the satisfaction of the security properties of the proxy
signature.
4.3 Results of implementation
Results of implementing the proposed scheme can be seen from figure 4.2 and table
4.2. The objectives of low communicational overhead and short signature length
have been achieved through the implementation of the proposed strong proxy
signature scheme with partial delegation. The other objectives were achieved in
the design itself.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
The proposed Proxy signature scheme with partial delegation satisfies following
properties:
• verifiability
• non-repudiation
• non-designated
• Strong unforgeability
In proxy delegation phase, the mw, rM , SM can be transferred among the proxy
signers and hence this SM secret key can be used by any proxy signer to compute
proxy signing key x for signing messages. Thus property of non- designated is
achieved.
Since proxy signature of message m involves the identity of original signer IDM , so
a verifier can be convinced that proxy signer is authorized by the original signer
to sign the messages.
In this proxy signature scheme, proxy signing key x is computed by using
(SM , ST , Sproxy) where: Sproxy = xPh(mw, rM), xP is the private key of Proxy signer
P. Assuming that an original signer has access to secret key ST and his own key
SM but he still needs to access Sproxy to compute proxy signing key x. Computing
Sproxy is very difficult as it is known only to a proxy signer. Proxy key x and
xP are used in calculation of verification parameter t as given in the equation
(3.4.3). So, if the value calculated by verifier does not match with the value of
verification parameter calculated in proxy key generation phase, as in equation
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(3.5.1) then proxy signature would be regarded as invalid. In this way property of
strong unforgeability is satisfied.
The length of the proxy signing key is larger than that one used in Shum and Wei
scheme. Hence, it increases the security.
This project work also ensures that a signature of shorter length is obtained with-
out much computational overhead. The signature length of the proposed scheme is
64 bytes and size of the warrant is 63 bytes. Signature length is reduced from 200
bytes in Shum and Wei scheme to 64 bytes in proposed proxy signature scheme.
Reduced parameters and signature length provides security and reduces commu-
nication overhead, since less parameters have to be passed to the verifier.
The proposed scheme has a wide application in e-voting and e-cash system.
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